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Defence of space-based assets
 
Space-based assets (satellites and the 
terrestrial ground stations that communicate 
with them) provide critical support to military 
and civilian operations. They are vulnerable to 
unintentional damage and disruption, and to 
deliberate attack. This note outlines how the 
UK uses and accesses satellites, potential risks 
to satellites, and approaches to mitigation. 
 
Overview 
◼ Space-based assets are critical national 
infrastructure, enabling many key services. 
◼ Satellites are vulnerable to deliberate attack, 
space weather, and collisions with debris or 
other satellites. 
◼ The numbers of satellites and satellite 
operators are growing, increasing levels of 
space debris and the chances of collisions. 
◼ The US, Russia, China, and India have 
tested anti-satellite missiles in space. 
◼ Mitigation strategies include removing debris 
from orbit, setting up terrestrial alternatives, 
and technical defences to hinder attack. 
◼ The UK owns military satellites for 
communications but relies on allies for other 
defence-related satellite services. 
◼ The UK plans to spend £6.4 bn on space 
defence capabilities over the next 10 years. 
 
Background 
Space-based assets are considered part of UK critical national 
infrastructure,1 and are important for civilian activities in many 
sectors, such as transport, finance and utilities.2 They are also 
central to military operations, for example, for surveillance, 
communications, navigation and ballistic missile detection.3,4 
The UK space industry was estimated to support 45,100 jobs 
and to generate income of £16.4 bn per year, in 2018/19.5 
Satellite services also support the wider economy. In 2018/19, 
at least £361 bn of UK GDP was estimated to come from non-
financial industries that were supported by satellite services.6,5 
Disruption to satellite services could have significant financial 
impacts.7 In 2017, the London Economics consultancy 
estimated that a five-day disruption to global navigation 
satellites might cost the UK £5.2 bn.8 
Space is becoming an increasingly congested, contested and 
complex environment.9 Early space activities were dominated 
by the US and the former Soviet Union, however, technological 
developments and falling costs have allowed many other states 
and companies to develop space capabilities.4,10–12 In the past 
decade, China, Russia and India have expanded their space 
programmes (including anti-satellite missile capabilities), and 
many other nations have set up their own space programmes. 
UK defence relies heavily on space-based assets, and evidence 
presented to the Commons Defence Select Committee suggests 
that this dependence is likely to increase in the future.13 
Commercial activity is also increasing. The number of active 
satellites orbiting Earth has risen from approximately 2200 in 
Feb 2020, to almost 4100 in May 2021.14,15 73% of satellites 
provide services to commercial users, and this is set to 
rise.14,16,17 In the next decade, firms such as SpaceX, Amazon 
and OneWeb aim to launch constellations of thousands of low-
cost satellites into low-Earth orbit (160-2000km above the 
Earth) to provide global broadband services.18–22  
In its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and 
Foreign Policy, the UK Government set out its ambition to be 
able to monitor and defend UK interests in space by 2030 (Box 
1). It said that in 2021 it will publish a defence space strategy 
(originally due in 2018) as well as a national space strategy.23,24  
UK use of space-based assets 
Satellites transmit information via radio signals. Ground stations 
send data (including operating instructions) to satellites, and 
satellites send data to ground stations, users or other satellites. 
Satellites usually provide one or more of the following services, 
which are used in both civilian and military operations (Box 2).4  
◼ Positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) - sending 
users an accurate measure of their local time and location.2,4 





Box 1: UK space and defence policy 
Within Government, responsibility for space sits across a 
number of departments: the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (for 
military space policy); the Department for Business, Energy 
& Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the UK Space Agency (for 
commerce and critical national infrastructure that is not 
defence-specific); and the Cabinet Office.1 Following a 
Government review of space governance and structures, 
high-level policy and strategy functions are due to move 
from the UK Space Agency to BEIS by Autumn 2021.25,26 
Over the next 10 years, the Government has committed 
around £5 bn to upgrade the SKYNET system of military 
communication satellites, and a further £1.4 bn for other 
space-based capabilities.27 The Integrated Review outlined 
the Government’s plans for an integrated approach across 
military and civil space policy,27–29 including:  
◼ A UK Space Command (launched in April 2021), to control 
and develop MoD space capabilities and to assist with 
coordinating commercial space operations  
◼ Commercial facilities for launching satellites by 2022 
◼ A Space Academy to train defence space specialists 
◼ Developing a UK-built intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance satellite constellation 
◼ Developing other space capabilities, such as systems to 
track space debris and to investigate incidents in space. 
◼ Communication - providing television, broadband internet, 
telephone and data transfer services.30   
◼ Observation and sensing - imaging the Earth and space 
using a number of different sensors (POSTnote 566).31–34 
UK access to space-based assets 
UK access to certain satellite data and communications services 
comes via UK-owned assets (including those managed by 
companies on behalf of the Government). However, most 
services are provided through agreements with allied nations.35  
UK-owned assets 
Communications 
In May 2021, 241 satellites were owned or operated by UK-
based organisations.14,36 The OneWeb constellation accounted 
for 182 of these, which is part-owned by the UK Government.37 
The British Armed Forces and UK allies receive global 
communications coverage through the SKYNET system of six 
satellites, which is owned and operated on behalf of the MoD 
by Airbus Defence and Space.29,38 SKYNET is being upgraded, 
including plans to launch an extra satellite in 2025 (Box 1).39  
Earth observation (EO) 
The RAF launched Carbonite-2 in 2018, a demonstration 
mission for EO satellite technology.40 The Government plans to 
increase UK EO capabilities with a new intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance satellite constellation (Box 1).27,41,42 
Launch facilities 
Currently, the UK has no satellite launch capability and UK-
based companies use facilities in other nations.43 However, 
spaceports that can launch small satellites (under 180kg) are 
being developed in Scotland, Wales and Cornwall.44–46 
Access via other states and international alliances 
Positioning, navigation and timing 
The UK relies on the US-owned Global Positioning System (GPS) 
for PNT services.56 The EU is developing Galileo, its own global 
Box 2: Example uses of satellites 
Civilian applications 
◼ Emergency services: satellite navigation services are 
used to locate and travel to incidents.47 
◼ Energy networks: the national grid uses satellite timing 
services for electricity delivery.48 
◼ Financial transactions: highly accurate timestamps are 
required for trading and audit purposes.2,48 
◼ Food and farming: satellite navigation is used in food 
distribution and automated agricultural vehicles.49,50 
◼ Transport: road, rail, air and sea transport all rely heavily 
on satellite navigation signals.8 
◼ Communications: mobile phone networks, internet 
services and broadcasting use satellite networks.48 
◼ Research: data from satellite-based sensors help to 
monitor air quality and changes in climate.51,52 
Military applications  
◼ Navigation: gives geographic guidance for personnel and 
for targeting precision weapons.3 
◼ Communications: enables command and control, 
supports decision making and provides welfare services.53 
◼ Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance: 
enables precision targeting of munitions, threat analysis, 
missile warning, and battle damage assessments.3,54 
◼ Weather monitoring: provides information about 
conditions in areas of operations.55 
navigation satellite system, to gain greater control over its PNT 
services and an alternative if GPS fails (POSTbrief 37).57,58 The 
UK left the Galileo programme after withdrawing from the EU.59 
It can still access Galileo’s ‘open’ PNT services, but not the 
more resilient encrypted Public Regulated Service, intended for 
military and emergency services use.60 The Government is 
investing £2 m to improve the resilience of UK PNT services and 
explore options for a UK satellite PNT system, under the Space 
Based PNT Programme.61 An initial estimate made in 2018 
suggested that a UK equivalent to Galileo could cost £3-5 bn.62  
Earth observation 
The UK continues to participate in the EU EO programme, 
Copernicus, which produces satellite data for many applications 
ranging from border security to climate monitoring.63,63,64 The 
British Armed Forces get most of their EO data for satellite 
surveillance and reconnaissance from the US.65 
Potential risks to satellites 
Risks can vary between individual satellite missions.66 Satellite 
services may be disrupted through unintentional damage, 
disruption or deliberate attacks by states or non-state actors.  
Unintentional damage and disruption  
Collisions with space debris or spacecraft 
Space debris refers to all human-made objects in orbit around 
the Earth, or re-entering the atmosphere, that no longer have a 
function.67 It includes defunct satellites, rocket stages used to 
launch satellites and small fragments from collisions, explosions 
or deterioration of active satellites.68,69 The European Space 
Agency (ESA) estimates that there are roughly 34,000 objects 
larger than 10cm, 0.9 million (m) from 1 to 10cm, and 128 m 
from 1mm to 1cm.70 Even small objects can be a serious risk, 
due to the high speeds at which they move.71 The effects of a 
collision between a satellite and an object can vary from the 
loss of subsystems to its total destruction. 




Collisions can create more debris. ESA reported an average of 
12 debris creation events (caused by collisions, detachment of 
objects or explosions) every year for the past 20 years.72 It has 
been suggested that if debris becomes sufficiently dense, a 
collision might trigger a cascade of further collisions, potentially 
rendering some orbits unusable.73–75 As the number of satellites 
grows, the chances of them colliding with other spacecraft or 
debris also rises.72 There are guidelines to avoid creating new 
debris, but it is difficult to determine responsibility for removing 
the vast amount of debris already in orbit (Box 3).67,76  
Space weather 
‘Space weather’ describes changes in the environmental 
conditions of the region of space close to the Earth, caused by 
radiation and material ejected from the Sun.77 In an extreme 
space weather event, the Royal Academy of Engineering 
estimates that up to 10% of satellites could experience 
temporary outages lasting hours to days, with loss or disruption 
of satellite-enabled services.78 Understanding of how often the 
Earth will experience an extreme space weather event is poor. 
The UK’s National Risk Register gives a 1-5% chance of a 
severe space weather event occurring within the next year.79,80 
Deliberate attacks 
‘Counterspace capabilities’ can be used to target satellites, 
ground stations or other assets. There are four types: those 
using direct force to cause physical damage (kinetic physical), 
those that cause physical damage without touching the satellite 
(non-kinetic physical), electronic weapons, and cyber-attacks.81  
Kinetic physical counterspace weapons 
These weapons make direct physical contact with a satellite or 
ground station. They can be either ‘direct ascent’, where they 
are launched from the ground, or ‘co-orbital’, where they are 
placed in the Earth’s orbit and manoeuvred towards an 
intended target.81 The US, Russia, China, and India have all 
tested kinetic physical anti-satellite missiles against their own 
satellites in low-Earth orbit (Library Briefing 9261).10,24,82–85 
There have been unconfirmed reports of China testing ballistic 
missiles that could reach geostationary orbit (36,000km above 
the Earth).10,86,87 Technologies under development to service 
satellites in orbit, or to remove inactive satellites after use, 
might also be adapted to attack an adversary’s satellite.88,89 
There are no known examples of kinetic counterspace weapons 
being used against an adversary’s satellite.10,90 
Non-kinetic physical counterspace weapons 
These weapons cause physical damage to satellites or ground 
stations without making physical contact. Lasers can either 
temporarily blind a satellite’s sensors or cause permanent 
damage by overheating the satellite’s electronics.81 The US, 
China and Russia are thought to be developing high energy 
lasers for anti-satellite use but there is no public evidence to 
suggest these are being used operationally.10,91 High-power 
microwave weapons (HPMs) fire short bursts of microwave 
energy at a target satellite, damaging or destroying electrical 
systems.92 The US has developed HPMs for terrestrial military 
use, but there is no publicly available evidence of it developing 
HPMs for use in space.10 India recently announced plans to 
develop both laser and microwave-based weapons.90 
Box 3: International governance of space 
Nation states are responsible for their space activities, 
including those carried out by non-governmental entities 
such as companies.93 Five UN treaties outline broad 
principles for space-related activities, the most significant of 
which is the Outer Space Treaty 1967.94 There have been 
some calls for the laws governing the use of space to be 
updated.95 The UK has proposed a UN General Assembly 
First Committee resolution on reducing space threats 
through norms, rules and responsible behaviour.96,97  
Any person or organisation that operates, launches, or 
procures the launch of a satellite, must obtain authorisation 
from their national government.93 The Civil Aviation 
Authority, which issues licences in the UK, requires operators 
to state the length of mission and method of de-orbiting 
after use.98 The G7 nations have issued a statement 
recognising the growing hazard of space debris and 
committing to the safe and sustainable use of space.99 
Electronic weapons 
These target the radio signals that carry data to and from 
satellites. For example, jamming technology boosts background 
noise at the same frequency as the radio signals, preventing 
the receiver from distinguishing them from the noise. Spoofing 
involves an adversary sending a false signal to a satellite or 
ground station that appears to be genuine. This enables them 
to give satellites false information, or even false commands.81  
The availability and relative low-cost of electronic jamming and 
spoofing technologies make electronic attacks accessible to 
both state and non-state actors.90 There have been reports of 
suspected Russian spoofing of GPS, including within Russia, 
Crimea and Syria; and Russian jamming of GPS to disrupt the 
use of drones in Syria and the Ukraine.100–103 There have also 
been reports of jamming and spoofing of ships’ GPS signals at 
the Chinese port of Shanghai, leading to their locations being 
incorrectly reported to crew and other vessels.104,105 
Cyber-attacks 
Cyber-attacks can target satellites, ground systems, or end-user 
equipment such as GPS receivers. They may involve monitoring 
data traffic patterns, intercepting data, or inserting false or 
corrupt data into the system.81,106–109 Cyber-attacks require in-
depth knowledge of the target systems, but do not necessarily 
need significant resources and can be contracted out, for 
example to organised crime groups or terrorists.81,110,111   
Attribution of incidents 
A kinetic physical counterspace attack would likely be easily 
observable and attributable to its source.112 By contrast, non-
kinetic physical attacks can be more difficult to attribute. The 
approximate location of a laser attack could be traced, but 
HPMs are difficult to trace back to their origin.81 Electronic 
attacks can be hard to detect and distinguish from accidental 
interference, making identification and attribution challenging. 
In addition, once jamming and spoofing are turned off, 
communications return to normal.81,113 Cyber-attacks can be 
difficult to attribute and may go undetected for long periods.106 
A further challenge for attribution is that satellite systems are 
often ‘dual use’, because they can be used for both civilian and 
military activities.114,115 A purported civilian satellite might be 
used in a military capacity without an adversary realising.116  





Difficulties with attributing attacks, combined with forms of 
attack that are reversible or non-destructive, make it easier for 
adversaries to use space to pursue their political goals through 
“sub-threshold” activities. These are activities that the 
perpetrator believes fall below the threshold of overt 
conflict.117–119 For example, Norway has accused Russia of 
disrupting navigation systems during NATO training exercises, 
also affecting commercial aircraft flying in the area.120,121 
Mitigating the risks to satellites 
The MoD tests its dependence on space-based assets through 
classified audits and simulations of military operations.25 It does 
not publish details about UK space defence capabilities. Space 
situational awareness (Box 4) provides a picture of the space 
environment and is a key tool for identifying potential risks. 
Other approaches may also help to reduce the risks posed to a 
satellite from unintentional damage or deliberate attack, and to 
improve the resilience of critical services.81 Appropriate 
mitigation measures can vary between satellite missions.66 
Reducing the risk of unintentional damage 
Space debris removal 
Academic studies have modelled a range of potential space 
debris removal mechanisms. For example: 
◼ lasers positioned on the ground or on nearby spacecraft to 
push debris out of orbit 
◼ nets, harpoons or sails thrown from a satellite to trap debris 
◼ satellites with robotic arms to collect debris.122–125  
Most of these methods have not been tested in space, but the 
RemoveDEBRIS project successfully trialled two techniques - a 
net and a harpoon - in orbit in 2018.126,127 Astroscale, a debris 
removal company, is also developing technology to remove 
retired satellites fitted with a specific attachment.128  
Improving resilience to space weather 
Shielding materials can be used to protect satellites from solar 
radiation.129 With sufficient notice, operators can lower satellite 
power to reduce the damage done by a space weather event.130 
The UK Government plans to publish a space weather strategy 
in 2021 and is investing £20m in the SWIMMR project to 
improve space weather prediction and monitoring.106,131,132  
Reducing the risk of deliberate attack 
Technical defences 
Technical features can be incorporated into the physical 
structure or software of a satellite system to make it more 
difficult to attack. In some cases, these may add to the weight 
and cost of the satellite. Example features include:  
◼ Surrounding electronics with protective materials to shield 
against high-power microwave attacks 
◼ Fitting filters over satellite sensors to protect against lasers 
◼ Using directional antenna on ground stations, or changing 
satellite signal frequency, to mitigate electronic attacks 
◼ Encrypting satellite signals, which can prevent a cyber 
intrusion. This is standard practice with military systems but 
is not always done with commercial systems. 
◼ ‘Air-gapping’ a satellite system by separating it from the 
public internet, to avoid cyber-attacks (which is difficult for 
satellite systems that produce data for public use).30,81,133 
Box 4: Space situational awareness 
Space situational awareness (SSA) is the ability to observe, 
track and predict the movement of objects in orbit.134 This 
helps to reduce the risk of satellites colliding with space 
debris or other spacecraft. SSA can also monitor other space 
users’ behaviour. A closely related term - space domain 
awareness (SDA) - is sometimes used, particularly in defence 
contexts, and tends to include a focus on intelligence 
activities.135–138 The British Armed Forces obtain SSA data 
from the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN), which 
consists mainly of ground-based telescopes and radar 
sensors. The UK contributes some data to SSN via a radar 
facility in Yorkshire.139,140,141 The National Space Operations 
Centre aims to enhance the UK’s ability to collect and 
respond to SDA data.27,142  
Export controls 
The dual-use nature of satellites means that the export of 
certain parts requires a license, under international export 
control agreements.143,144 The Integrated Review stated that 
the UK will seek to ensure that export control systems reduce 
the proliferation of space weapons and dual-use technologies.28  
Improving the resilience of critical services 
The resilience of satellite networks can be improved through 
the way that they are designed and operated. If satellites are 
disrupted, access to terrestrial alternatives can help to maintain 
access to critical services.13,145  
Use of multiple satellites 
A swarm approach - where one system is made up of a network 
of multiple satellites - can help to make both military and civil 
satellite systems more resilient.146–148 If one satellite fails, 
others can maintain the same services.149  
Modifying satellite operations 
Satellites can be operated strategically to ensure the continued 
provision of services. If one satellite is damaged, a new satellite 
can be deployed in its place.150 Satellites can be manoeuvred in 
order to avoid unguided kinetic physical counterspace weapons, 
but guided missiles or other satellites would be harder to 
evade. Satellites can avoid detection by using radar-absorbing 
coatings or jamming adversaries’ detection sensors.81,151 
Enhancing cyber-resilience 
A stakeholder consultation by Chatham House suggested 
approaches for improving cyber-resilience. These included 
developing industry-led standards; increasing cooperation 
internationally and between different stakeholder groups (e.g. 
operators, government agencies and manufacturers); and 
improving understanding of security requirements and 
vulnerabilities, across the space and cyber communities.111,152  
Terrestrial alternatives 
The £2m National Timing Centre is developing a network of 
atomic clocks across the UK, as a terrestrial alternative to 
satellite-based timing signals.153 However, terrestrial 
alternatives may not always be available, and have their own 
vulnerabilities. Training can help personnel to understand the 
dependences and vulnerabilities of systems and to obtain the 
skills needed to operate without access to satellite services.13 
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